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I n a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland in Dedo v. State, 343 
Md. 2, 680 A.2d 464 (1996), held 
that a defendant may be granted 
credit toward his sentence for time 
served in home detention, subse-
quent to conviction, but prior to 
sentencing. Broadly construing 
Maryland Annotated Code Article 
27, section 638C(a) (1992 & Supp. 
1995), the court held that a defen-
dant's commitment to a county 
detention center's warden, through 
placement in home detention, con-
stituted constructive custody of 
that defendant by a public institu-
tion. Thus, a defendant in home 
detention is in custody of an insti-
tution within the meaning of the 
statute, thereby allowing the time 
spent in home detention to be cred-
ited against the sentence eventu-
ally imposed. 
On August 15, 1993, Robert 
Dedo ("Dedo") was arrested and 
charged with possession with in-
tent to distribute a controlled dan-
gerous substance. He was released 
on bond on October 14, 1993. 
Dedo was subsequently indicted 
and convicted in the Circuit Court 
of Wicomico County. Upon con-
viction, Dedo requested that his 
sentence be deferred until the end 
of August 1994, in order to receive 
medical treatment. After indicat-
ing that he would be inclined to 
accept any arrangement that would 
convince the court of his appear-
ance for sentencing, the circuit 
court placed Dedo in home 
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detention. 
The court ordered Dedo to 
report to the warden of the county 
detention center, where he signed 
a home detention contract. Under 
the contract, Dedo agreed to be 
"incarcerated" in his home while 
being electronically monitored by 
the Wicomico County Department 
of Corrections. Dedo also agreed 
to allow the home detention staff 
unlimited access to his home to 
ensure his compliance with the 
numerous conditions of the con-
tract. Furthermore, the contract 
provided that if Dedo violated any 
of these conditions, he would be 
returned to the detention center for 
the remainder of his sentence. 
Upon sentencing, Dedo asked 
the court to credit his sentence for 
the time he spent in home deten-
tion. Reasoning that time served 
in home detention is not the equiv-
alent of time served in jail, the 
circuit court judge denied Dedo's 
request. The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the 
judgment of the circuit court. Sub-
sequently, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari to 
consider whether, under section 
638C(a), a defendant must be 
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granted credit toward his sentence 
for time spent in home detention 
between conviction and 
sentencing. 
Section 638C(a) provides, in 
pertinent part, that "[a ]ny person 
... shall receive credit against the 
term . . . for all time spent in the 
custody of any state, county or city 
jail, correctional institution, hospi-
tal, mental hospital or other agency 
. ... " Dedo, 343 Md. at 4, 680 
A.2d at 465 (quoting MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 27, § 638C(a) (1992 & 
Supp. 1995)). Dedo argued that he 
should be permitted to receive 
credit against his sentence because 
he was in the "constructive cus-
tody" of the Wicomico County 
Detention Center, even though he 
was not physically present at the 
detention center. Id. at 8, 680 
A.2d at 467. The State countered 
that home detention is not "cus-
tody" within the meaning of the 
statute, noting that Dedo was not 
committed to either ajail or a cor-
rectional facility. Id. The State 
percei ved Dedo' s partaking in the 
home detention program as "vol-
untary," because he had requested 
it, and therefore not the same as 
incarceration. Id. 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland began its analysis by set-
ting forth the specific purpose of 
the statute. The statute "pre-
clude[s] a defendant from 'bank-
ing' time before he or she commits 
a new offense," while likewise 
crediting a defendant for "dead" 
time spent in custody. Id at 9,680 
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 31 
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time spent in custody. Id. at 9, 680 
A.2d at 467-68 (citing Fleeger v. 
State, 301 Md. 155, 163-65, 482 
A.2d 490, 494-95 (1984». The 
court then stated the general pur-
pose of the statute is to guarantee 
that a defendant obtain as much 
credit as possible for time spent in 
custody. Id. at 9, 680 A.2d at 468 
(citing Fleeger, 301 Md. at 165, 
482 A.2d at 495). The court em-
phasized that in order to come 
within the reach of the statute, 
Dedo was required to show that he 
was both "in custody" and in a jail 
or other public institution. Id. 
Next, the court distinguished 
Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 532 
A.2d 1066 (1987). Id. at 9-10, 680 
A.2d at 468. In Maus, the court of 
appeals examined the meaning of 
the words "in the custody of any 
state, county or city jail, correc-
tional institution, hospital, mental 
hospital or other agency" and con-
cluded that credit should not be 
granted for time spent in a residen-
tial drug treatment program. !d. 
In contrasting Maus with Dedo, 
the court noted that the defendant 
in Maus could not have been pun-
ished if he had escaped from the 
drug treatment program since his 
participation was voluntary. !d. at 
10, 680 A.2d at 468. Dedo, on the 
other hand, was subject to prosecu-
tion for any unauthorized absence 
or escape. from his home. Thus, 
the court of special appeals erred 
in relying on Maus, as it was dis-
tinguishable from Dedo. Id. at 11, 
680 A.2d at 469. 
Although the court distin-
guished the facts of Maus, it 
utilized the same analysis em-
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 32 
ployed in Maus. Id. The court 
made clear that "[ w ] here a defen-
dant is punishable for the crime of 
escape for an unauthorized depar-
ture from the place of confinement, 
the custody requirement of section 
638C(a) is met." Id. A defendant 
is not "in custody" unless there 
existed substantial impediments to 
that individual's freedom. Id. 
Given the strict conditions of 
Dedo's home detention contract, 
the court found the contract was 
"sufficiently incarcerative" to ful-
fill the custody requirement of 
section 638C(a). Id. at 12, 680 
A.2d at 469. 
In continuing its analysis, the 
court rejected the State's conten-
tion that Dedo's time spent in 
home detention was voluntary, and 
not sufficiently incarcerative, due 
to the fact that Dedo had requested 
an alternative sentencing arrange-
ment. Id. at 13,680 A.2d at 470. 
To the contrary, the court held that 
"where an individual [can be pun-
ished] for escape for any unex-
cused absence from the place of 
confinement, his confinement is 
necessarily involuntary." Id. Thus, 
the court held that Dedo was 
clearly in custody while serving 
home detention. Id. 
Reasoning that commitment to 
the custody of the warden was 
tantamount to constructive custody 
by a public institution, the court 
found that Dedo's home consti-
tuted an "institution" under the 
statute. Id. Reversing the court of 
special appeals, the court of ap-
peals determined that an individual 
restrained in home detention was 
"incarcerated 'in a local detention 
center,' in the sense that the pris-
oner's home can be said to be an 
extension of the local detention 
center." Id. at 13-14,680 A.2d at 
470 (quoting 91 Op. Att'y Gen. 
189,192 (1991». 
In Dedo v. State, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that 
time spent in home detention be-
tween conviction and sentencing 
may be credited against the sen-
tence imposed. Through a broad 
interpretation of section 638C(a), 
the court effectuated the General 
Assembly's dual purpose of: (1) 
prohibiting defendants from accu-
mulating time between trial and 
sentencing that could be used to 
offset a sentence for a future, yet 
uncompleted crime; and (2) mini-
mizing time spent in custody not 
credited toward a future sentence. 
This interpretation of section 
638C(a) can help defense attorneys 
seek more ideal custody situations 
for clients that would be amenable 
to in home detention. Further-
more, in a time when prison 
overcrowding is a serious problem, 
this decision may help alleviate 
further overcrowding by guaran-
teeing that defendants will receive 
credit for time spent in custody. 
